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Approximately thirty years after their inception, the use of genetically modified 
organisms, or GMOs, remains contentious. Often, proponents of their use contend that 
the potential of GMOs to mitigate poverty and hunger in the “developing world” 
outweighs concerns in the “developed world” about their potential risks. This line of 
argument simultaneously decontextualizes poverty in the “developing world” from its 
multi-faceted roots in favor of a simple technological fix and precludes the possibility of 
anti-GMO sentiment that originates within the “developing world” itself. Focusing on 
India, I first shed light on the history of applying such simple technological fixes to the 
problem of hunger and then utilize textual analysis to explore varying perspectives on 
GMOs in order to make a case for why debates focusing on an objective “goodness” or 
“badness” of GMOs miss the point. 
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CHAPTER I.  
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE GMO DEBATE  
The 2016 documentary Food Evolution opens with a debate held by a Hawaiian 
county government council over whether to permit the production of genetically modified 
organisms, or GMOs, on the island. The debate ends with the majority of council 
members voting to ban GMOs, based largely on both their own beliefs and the 
impassioned speeches presented by concerned locals and at least one prominent non-
local. Throughout its hour and thirty-two minute run, Food Evolution, which challenges 
the public’s fears over GMOs, paints a largely empathetic image of the anti-GMO voices 
heard, acknowledging that they are coming from a place of wanting “safe, abundant, 
nutritious food for all” (Hamilton & Sheehan, 2016). At the same time, narrator and 
astrophysicist Neil Degrasse Tyson poses the question, “What if, while trying to do the 
right thing, the council got it wrong [by opposing GMOs]?”  This question leads to the 
main thesis of Food Evolution, which is that no credible scientific evidence has been 
found for GMOs being dangerous to either human health or the environment, and fears 
over GMOs are based on something other than scientific fact and often spurred on by 
fearmongers such as attorney and executive director of the Center for Food Safety 
Andrew Kimbrell, for example. The documentary suggests that GMOs are being 
needlessly pilloried to the detriment of humanity, since those in need would not reap the 
benefits provided by GMOs (Hamilton & Sheehan, 2016). Later on, the documentary 
triumphantly returns to the same Hawaiian island to showcase the reversal of the GMO 
ban in the light of the success of rainbow papaya in resisting a virus that has decimated 
its non-GMO counterparts. 
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In addition to claims of unreasoned public hysteria over GMOs, the documentary 
alleges that misinformation about the purported hazards of GMOs originates in the “rich 
world” of the global North and spreads to the “poor world” of the global South, where 
such misinformation is particularly damaging, given the potential of GMOs to alleviate 
poverty through higher yields, resistance to diseases or pests, heightened nutritional 
value, or any number of other traits that might prove especially useful to poorer farmers. 
Illustrating this point, Food Evolution cuts from shots of a speech in which Kimbrell 
proudly lists the various types of genetically modified crops that have been prevented 
from going into production with wrenching shots of a young Ugandan child watching the 
diseased banana crops of his mother’s subsistence farm burn. Then, the documentary cuts 
again to a more successful South African farmer who directly addresses his American 
audience, stating, “Americans, beware. Please, be informed that whenever you say ‘no’ to 
GM technology, you are suppressing Africa. South Africa and the rest of the continent is 
being left behind” (Hamilton & Sheehan, 2016). Thus, while Food Evolution makes an 
appeal in support of GMOs to reason and scientific analysis, it also presents a moral 
argument for their acceptance, i.e. that people in wealthy countries should not hinder the 
production of GMOs because they are needed in less wealthy countries.  
In this way, Food Evolution embodies two common threads of argument made by 
those in the pro-GMO community, namely that the debate over whether or not GMOs 
should be allowed to be propagated can largely be solved by the scientific community 
determining whether or not they are hazardous, and that GMOs are necessary to feed the 
developing world, particularly in the face of global climate change (Hamilton & Sheehan, 
2016). It is these two assertions that I seek to challenge here. I argue that focusing on the 
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objective “goodness” or “badness” of GMOs ignores the vital question of how they are 
being used, the situatedness of technology and the role played by social structures, 
governmental policies, and power dynamics in determining whether a community either 
benefits from or is harmed by (or perhaps in certain instances even experiences no 
appreciable change from) the use of a given technology. Therefore, I argue that the GMO 
debate is largely a proxy for, and thus a distraction from, ideological debates over 
differing agricultural models and, more broadly, differing views on social development 
itself, in which the pro-GMO side generally assumes the inherent and objective 
desirability of both1. Furthermore, as I will illustrate, the moral argument that GMOS are 
necessary to feed the developing world, and that their utilization should therefore not be 
prevented, detrimentally decontextualizes poverty in the developing world from its 
historical roots and ignores the multifaceted nature of the issue of widespread hunger in 
favor of a simple technological fix. Framing the debate in such terms also sets up 
biotechnology as a sort of “cure all” for whatever food-related problems the developing 
world may face, particularly since GMOs are often described according to their potential 
iterations, rather than their current usage. 
Most GMOs produced today are developed to either be herbicide resistant, such 
as “Roundup Ready Soy” or to produce their own insecticides in the form of Bt, a 
naturally occurring bacterium in soils which is toxic to certain types of insects (Shiva, 
                                                
1 Consider,*for*example, the categories of “developed” versus “developing” countries. These categories 
implicitly suggest that “development” follows a linear course, with “developing” countries seeking to reach 
the end goal of becoming “developed”, which may or may not actually be the case. Furthermore, it is no 
coincidence that those countries now thought of as “developed” are largely ones that formerly held colonial 
control over those now considered “developing”. However, while problematic, I will continue to use these 
terms, both because they are repeated used throughout the works I cite and because they do connote 
important distinctions between two parts of the world, which are also often referred to as the “global 
North” and “global South”. 
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2016). Proponents argue that GMOs will help small-scale farmers be more productive 
(and that Bt technology lowers pesticide usage and therefore exposure, thus benefitting 
farmer health), improving their livelihoods while also increasing a country’s export 
capabilities. Detractors argue for a return to more traditional agricultural methods and 
stewardship of the land, often privileging local production and consumption over 
participation in the global market. As they are currently produced, GMOs fit within the 
paradigm of modern industrial agriculture ushered in by Norman Borlaug’s Green 
Revolution of the 1960’s. This paradigm focuses on increasing yields of mono-crops 
through the use of chemical inputs (e.g. fertilizers and pesticides) and “improved” 
varieties of seeds. Thus, the GMO debate may also be viewed as a stand-in for broader 
debates over the current path of development.    
India provides an ideal representative case study for analysis, given its position as 
a country largely transformed by the Green Revolution and where the “second Green 
Revolution”, as the influx of biotechnology is often called, is still hotly debated. 
Although it has a thriving information technology sector and increasing national wealth, 
India is still thought of as a developing country, and it is one in which the majority of the 
population remains rural and largely marginal farmers or landless agricultural laborers. 
Furthermore, according to FAO estimates, as of 2015 approximately 16% of the Indian 
population was undernourished, 48% of women between the ages of 15 and 49 were 
anemic, and 44% of children under the age of 5 were underweight (FAO, 2015). 
Secondly, India has a long history of recurring famines and impoverished circumstances 
that have largely been attributed to India’s ever-growing population size. Both of these 
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factors would seem to make India an ideal place to utilize biotechnology2 in order to 
increase nutrition rates.  
Yet the utilization of biotechnology has been a sustained subject of controversy in 
India. Currently, Bt cotton is the only form of GMO that can legally be grown in India, 
although it is worth noting that approximately 90% of the cotton grown there is Bt, which 
suggests a high level of popularity among growers (“Production dips”, 2013). While 
pressure has been put on the legislature in the last several years to legalize genetically 
modified mustard (used in making edible oils) and Bt brinjal, or eggplant (Damodaran 
and Sinha, 2016), in the last year there have also been widespread calls among farmers to 
end the use of any GMOs in the wake of devastating whitefly outbreaks, which are not 
susceptible to Bt technology (Vasudeva, 2015). Lastly, in the last few years, Indian has 
been described as being on the verge of an “agrarian crisis”, and there have been several 
farmer protests, some of which have turned violent, and highly publicized (and 
continuous) farmer suicides (Mohani, 2017). Many people, from scientific experts to 
journalists, argue that the only way to solve this agrarian crisis is through the use of 
GMOs.  
Such arguments are made in regards to developing countries throughout the 
world. Robert Paarlberg (2008), adjunct professor of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy 
school and former member of the Biotechnology Advisory Council to Monsanto’s CEO, 
adamantly believes that the developing world, but particularly the African continent, 
                                                
2 Much like how a square fits the geometric definition of a rectangle, but a rectangle does not fit that of a 
square, “GMO” connotes a form of biotechnology, but the term “biotechnology” does not always mean 
“GMO”. However, since this work does not focus on more than one form of biotechnology, I will use the 
terms interchangeably. 
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needs biotechnology in order to alleviate poverty and adequately feed its population. He 
claims that such necessary progress is being stymied by “an imperialism of rich tastes” 
coming from the global North. He purports that Europeans have largely rejected GMOs 
due to “unrelated” public food safety scandals such as the 1996 case of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy, or “mad cow disease” impacting human health despite initial 
reassurance from regulators that the meat of contaminated animals was perfectly safe for 
human consumption (Paarlberg, 2008 p. 16). Paarlberg (2008) laments that the EU gave 
regulatory approval for the import and consumption of genetically modified crops during 
the same year as the mad cow scandal, arguing that GMOs were essentially unjustly 
scapegoated due to public mistrust of regulatory authorities. Paarlberg (2008) further 
argues that the ensuing backlash against GMOs in Britain and throughout Europe 
prompted a similar backlash in the developing world. Citing an article from the Journal 
of Agrobiotechnology Management, Paarlberg (2008) points out the fact that a large 
percentage of nations in the global South that share colonial ties to Europe also share the 
precautionary approach taken by Europe in regards to GMOs. Similarly, Herring and 
Paarlberg (2016) have noted that countries with economic ties to the United States have 
adopted the US’ more laissez faire approach to restrictions on GMOs.  
Paarlberg (2008) thus makes the case that poor people of the developing world are 
suffering unnecessarily because those in the developed world are thwarting the 
implementation of GMO technology based on unfounded fears, and that these fears are 
being spread to the developing world. As Paarlberg (2008) would have it, developing 
nations only resist biotechnology because the developed world does so. While there is 
certainly a case to be made against the dependence of developing nations on trade with 
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former colonial powers such as those in Europe and imperial powers such as the United 
States and the ways in which this dependence might influence policy among developing 
nations, there is an element of infantilization in the way scientists discuss the fears of the 
lay public in regards to GMOs. In this instance, it also borders the thin line between 
acknowledging the influence of the global North on the rest of the world and portraying 
members of the global North as subjects/actors and members of the global South as 
objects/the-acted-upon.  
In his treatise on modern food ethics, Philosophy professor at Michigan State 
University Paul Thompson (2015) grapples with this same question of whether it is 
appropriate for the public in the developed world to oppose biotechnology if it has the 
potential to aid disadvantaged peoples in the developing world. He terms this argument 
the “Borlaug hypothesis”, which he defines thusly: “even if you don’t see any value in 
applications of cutting-edge technology for food production and processing for yourself, 
you should still lend moral support to any technology that has the potential to help the 
poor” (Thompson, 2015, p. 200). Thompson (2015) then weighs whether the Borlaug 
hypothesis stands up to the main arguments made against the use of biotechnology, which 
he has separated into five basic categories of concern. These categories include: the 
precautionary principle, social justice, (un)naturalness, personal autonomy, and virtue 
ethics. Thompson (2015) ultimately argues that the Borlaug hypothesis does not stand up 
to the final category alone, which encompasses aretaic concerns regarding the virtue of 
the companies and scientists that produce GMOs, as these groups have been remiss in 
terms of transparency, adequately communicating with the public, and in some instances 
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exhibiting indifference to how the technology is being implemented in regards to social 
justice.   
 While his ultimate conclusion is compelling, I would argue that Thompson (2015) 
measures social justice and aretaic concerns according to different standards, thereby 
undermining his conclusion. Although he acknowledges the importance of social justice 
concerns levied against biotechnology and its producers, including the technology 
treadmill, dependency theory, and biopiracy, he claims that, because these concerns could 
be applied to any new agricultural technology, they do not in themselves constitute a 
reason to forego biotechnology. Rather, he argues, they provide parameters within which 
researchers should operate; he therefore opts to refer to these concerns as “side 
constraints” to the question of whether or not biotechnology should be utilized 
(Thompson, 2015). Thus, although he places aretaic concerns within the actual 
contemporary context of how GMOs are being produced in order to determine whether 
Borlaug’s hypothesis holds against them, he does not do the same with social justice 
concerns. Furthermore, he does a disservice to such concerns by referring to them as 
“side constraints”. After all, to those fighting for social justice, and more importantly, to 
those affected by injustice, they are anything but a “side constraint”. It is therefore part of 
the goal of this work to ameliorate this oversight. 
As I have illustrated thus far, pro-GMO scientists and thinkers contend that 
GMOs are necessary to feed the developing world and that their widespread use is being 
prevented by anti-GMO activists in the developed world without consideration of how 
their activism is ultimately harming those people who would stand to benefit most from 
biotechnology, i.e. the people of the developing world. While this is indeed a compelling 
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moral argument in favor of the implementation of GMOs, it ignores the possible reasons 
that people from the developing world might themselves be leery of biotechnology that 
go beyond being told by outside voices that they’re dangerous. Furthermore, whether or 
not intended as such, this argument sets up biotechnology as a simple technological fix to 
the problem of hunger without considering its multifaceted nature and how a given 
technology’s usefulness is determined by the context in which it is applied.  
Therefore, in focusing my analysis on India, it is my goal here to provide a greater 
understanding of how a country’s culture, history, and other factors play a role in a 
technology such as biotechnology’s acceptance and usefulness within that country. I 
further seek to elucidate the ways in which opposition to biotechnology in the developing 
world exists beyond a parroting of the opposition expressed in the developed world. 
Because my argument centers on the necessity of multiple and context-specific 
perspectives, I will conduct a textual analysis of the writing of two prominent voices 
within the Indian agricultural field, Vandana Shiva and M.S. Swaminathan. These two 
authors present differing viewpoints on the role biotechnology should play in Indian 
agriculture. Textual analysis involves interpreting specific texts and thereby allows for a 
greater understanding of the sense-making practices of the writers and the cultures within 
which they write (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000). While it is beyond the scope of this work 
to fully attempt to understand and articulate the different sense-making practices of these 
two writers, it is my goal to illustrate the ways in which they approach the role of 
biotechnology in India and Indian development practices and how these approaches are 
grounded in particular worldviews that largely differ in important ways from those of 
proponents of biotechnology in the United States.     
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Chapter Overview 
Following the introduction, my argument is divided into three chapters. The first 
of these chapters provides a historical lens through which to understand India’s 
agricultural development up to the present. I argue that India’s frequent famines in the 
last two centuries were in fact largely the product of British colonial governance, rather 
than simply resulting from overpopulation, as they have traditionally been understood. I 
further argue that this inaccurate understanding of agricultural shortages and famine has, 
in turn, paved the way for technological fixes to the twin problems of food shortage and 
malnutrition, because they are broadly viewed as a straightforward mismatch between 
production and consumption. I also elucidate the political agenda that has underlaid the 
supposedly humanitarian assistance and intervention in Indian agriculture on the part of 
the United States thus far. In the subsequent two chapters, I conduct a textual analysis of 
the works of two prominent figures in the Indian agricultural scene, Vandana Shiva and 
Mankombu Sambasivan Swaminathan (hereafter referred to as “M.S. Swaminathan”) 
respectively.  
 As one of the most prominent voices for the global anti-GMO movement, 
Vandana Shiva is an ideal subject for my work. I focus my analysis on her 2016 book 
Who Really Feeds the World? In this chapter, I argue that her perspective provides vital 
context for how GMOs- as they are currently produced- should be understood, giving 
reason for why a “developing” country such as India might resist the use of 
biotechnology for reasons that originated separately from concerns within the 
“developed” world over their use. According to Shiva (2016), GMOs are an inextricable 
part of the industrial food paradigm from which they have arisen, and the corporate 
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monopoly over them and the food system more broadly, serves as a form of neocolonial 
control.  
 The final chapter will focus on M.S. Swaminathan’s From Green to Evergreen 
Revolution, which anthologizes articles he has written for The Hindu in the last twenty 
years on the problems facing Indian agriculture and possible solutions to those issues. As 
the “Indian father of the Green Revolution”, Swaminathan provides a vital perspective 
from which to view the GMO debate and the role of biotechnology in India. I argue that 
his writing further illustrates the necessity of placing technology, including 
biotechnology, into its social context in order to determine whether it will actually be 
useful. While he is pro-GMO, Swaminathan consistently emphasizes the necessity of 
initiating broad-based policy and social reforms in order to improve both agricultural 
productivity and the material circumstances of Indian farmers, with biotechnology 
serving as a tool to enhance the effectiveness of the reforms. 
 In the final chapter, I summarize the arguments made in these chapters to 
illustrate why debating the objective “goodness” or “badness” of GMOs does not actually 
answer the question of whether or how they should be utilized. I conclude by returning to 
the moral argument that anti-GMO voices in the “developed” world should stifle their 
critique in light of the alleged potential of GMOs to feed those in the “developing” world. 
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CHAPTER II.  
AGRICULTURE, AFFLUENCE, AND HUNGER IN COLONIAL AND POST-
COLONIAL INDIA 
 
With its ancient culture, predominating polytheistic religion, and sensory 
vibrancy, India has captured the Western imaginary for centuries. As is the case with 
many other non-European nations, though, this Western fascination has largely centered 
on the “Otherness” of Indian culture, in which Westerners have understood India in 
relation to its fundamental difference from European cultures. As Rudyard Kipling 
(1898) stated, “East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.” 
Anthropologist Mary Douglas (1972), too, described India as a “mirror image” of 
Europe-its complete and total opposite. Yet, this fascination seems to have also always 
been tempered by fear. Immanuel Kant, for example, referred to Indians’ “dominating 
taste for the grotesque”, “their religion (one of) grotesqueries, idols of monstrous form” 
(Malhotra and Ahuja, 2012). This combination of fascination and fear, which very much 
continues to exist in the present day, is rooted in what post-colonial writer Edward Said 
(1978) terms “Orientalism”. Said (1978) defines Orientalism along several 
interdependent lines. In academic terms, it is any study, be it anthropological, 
sociological, historical, or otherwise, of the “the Orient”, which encompasses the Middle 
East, North Africa, and Asia, by members of “the Occident”, which mainly refers to 
Europe but which might loosely be described as “the West”. More importantly, though, 
he defines it as a type of discourse, a way of speaking about the Orient/East as being the 
ontological and epistemological opposite to the Occident/West (Said, 1978). Finally, 
through Orientalism as an academic discipline and form of discourse, it also serves as a 
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means for the West to claim knowledge over the “Orient” and thus authority over it (Said, 
1978). Said (1978) argues that Orientalism, particularly as it relates to India, fell largely 
under the purview of Britain and France in the nineteenth century, with the United States 
playing a greater role after World War II.   
Orientalist thought pervaded colonial India, which was under official British rule 
from 1858-1947 and unofficial British control for a century prior through the East India 
Trading Company. Viewing India through the lens of Orientalism influenced how the 
British understood the many famines that occurred in India throughout their reign, and, in 
turn, the British administrative response to those famines. Namely, famine was blamed 
on sheer overpopulation caused by highly prolific Indians who lacked self-discipline 
(Caldwell, 1998). Similar beliefs were also held within the United States in the post-
colonial era after World War II, with many prominent thinkers and scientists predicting 
imminent global famine because of overpopulation, predominately in developing 
countries outside the West (Paddock & Paddock, 1967; Ehrlich, 1968). Such famine was 
ultimately avoided thanks in large part to the Green Revolution, which vastly increased 
the supply of crops such as wheat and later rice and soy. In this way, the Green 
Revolution provided a solution to the problem of hunger in India, but one that did not 
stray from the colonial understanding of Indian famine as one of supply not meeting 
demand, in which the fault for this disparity lay with the Indian people. As I will 
illustrate, however, this diagnosis did not account for the ways in which colonial rule 
directly contributed to India’s impoverishment and inadequate agricultural production 
levels well into the twentieth century. Such oversight is vital to consider given current 
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calls for increased use of biotechnology to solve world hunger, which many refer to as a 
“second Green Revolution”.  
In order to understand these calls for a “second Green Revolution”, it is important 
to understand the context leading up to and including the initial Green Revolution in 
India, which occurred approximately twenty years after India gained independence from 
Britain. Prior to British control, the Bengal region was one of the wealthiest in the world, 
although this quickly changed under the East India Company (Mukerjee, 2010). During 
the formal colonial period, India provided so much wealth through trade goods such as 
spices, jewels, and textiles and a readily available labor (and soldier) pool that it was 
dubbed “The Jewel of the British Empire” (Empire-Learning Zone, 2012). India thus 
provided many of the raw materials necessary in the British Industrial Revolution, as well 
as a market for the much more expensive finished goods produced in Britain with these 
materials (Empire-Learning Zone, 2012). In this way, India played a direct role in the 
creation of British wealth. However, this rise in British fortune saw its equal and opposite 
effect on the Indian population. During this era, India experienced some of the worst 
recorded famines in human history, including the Bengal famine of 1943 that spurred the 
nationalist independence movement and arguably prompted the end of the British 
Empire. It has been estimated that between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries 
famines caused around 60 million deaths (Srinivasan, 2017).  
Rather than linking their own governmental policies to these famines, British 
administrators of the time took a Malthusian view of these famines, and thus, how their 
government should respond to famine in India (unsurprisingly, given that Malthus taught 
Political Economy at the East India Company’s College at Hertford, where many future 
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administrators were schooled) (Caldwell, 1998). From this viewpoint, famines were a 
natural means of bringing overpopulation back into equilibrium. Because, in their view, 
British rule had seemingly ended the other positive checks on population, including 
warfare and infanticide, famine became all but inevitable (Caldwell, 1998). These 
famines disproportionately affected the poorest parts of the population, who in more 
plentiful years also saw the highest birth rates. Therefore, the British believed that 
providing large quantities of aid to these populations would be self-defeating, as sparing 
contemporary populations from famine meant that they would continue to replicate, 
meaning there must then (supposedly) be even greater famine in future (Caldwell, 1998). 
Furthermore, taking anything from the better-off portions of society, whether through 
taxation or supply rationing, would only imperil the financial security of those 
populations, thereby also increasing the severity of future famines. Thus, it was 
ultimately in the best interest of all to let the market decide how to allocate resources 
(Caldwell, 1998). 
However, the case of the 1943 Bengal famine, which claimed approximately 3 
million lives, illustrates the fact that famine is not wholly determined by the disparity 
between production capacity and consumption needs. British imperial policies, and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill in particular, were largely responsible for the severity of the 
Bengal famine. Firstly, since the nineteenth century, much of Indian agriculture had been 
devoted to producing export goods such as opium (which the British used to subjugate 
China), tea (which eventually became a staple in Indian households but was originally 
produced for Britain), jute, and indigo, among others (Mukerjee, 2010). Many of these 
crops were grown using slave-like indentured servant labor, meaning that large tracts of 
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land were not being used to provide foodstuffs to local populations, and the wealth 
created by these products were also not reaching local populations (it is worth noting, too, 
that wealthier Indian landholders were complicit in this process).  
Of course, there are also often environmental elements, be they pests, blights, or 
natural disasters that play into the creation of famine by affecting the production side. 
Such conditions were certainly at play in Bengal, which, like much of India, is reliant on 
monsoon rains. In 1943, flooding, a cyclone along the Bengali coast, and a rice crop 
disease combined to create scarcity in the region (Mukerjee, 2010). Then this scarcity 
became a famine through the Churchill administration’s military accounting, which 
favored the British population and military efforts over the needs of Bengalis. Churchill 
declined to send any form of food aid, although some government aid was provided to 
urban populations, particularly British business people and their employees (Mukerjee, 
2010). On the contrary, food and other supplies were actually confiscated from the 
Bengali region in order to keep them out of the hands of Japanese forces, should they 
decide to invade (which they did not). British ships that might have carried aid to India 
were instead held in reserve for sending to Italy (in case it should come under Allied 
control). Although Canada and Australia wished to send aid, their available merchant 
ships were operating in the Atlantic Ocean, bringing food supplies to Britain itself, which 
already possessed a stockpile (Mukerjee, 2010). The rest of India, though, was not 
experiencing food shortages, and tens of thousands of tons of rice were being exported to 
Britain (Mukerjee, 2010). However, like the nineteenth century administrators before 
him, and true to Malthusian principles, Churchill placed blame for the famine on the 
Indian people themselves, stating that they “bred like rabbits”, which made sending them 
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aid useless (Mukerjee, 2010). Thus, nothing was done by the British to alleviate the 
suffering of the starving rural populations of Bengal, and the economic and emotional toll 
of the famine carried into the next decade. 
As mentioned previously, the severity of this famine and the apparent unconcern 
of the British government helped spur the drive for Indian independence, which was 
achieved in 1947. Pakistan was also partitioned from India at this time, thanks in large 
part to cultural cleavages wrought by the British in their divide-and-conquer method of 
rule that had long spurred antagonism between Muslims and Hindus (Mukerjee, 2010). 
Immediately, and in contrast to Gandhi’s advocacy supporting the superiority of localized 
village life, Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s government launched a program of rapid 
industrialization and modernization in order to “catch up” to the wealth and standards of 
the more industrialized nations, a Herculean task given the fact that the wealth of the 
more industrialized nations was largely achieved through exploitative colonial forces 
such as those described above (Cullather, 2010). In order to support industry growth, 
agricultural production needed to expand as well. So, new land was brought under 
cultivation, irrigation projects were embarked upon, agricultural universities were 
established, and land reforms were (somewhat unsuccessfully) attempted in order to 
break up and redistribute large shareholdings. This time period saw rapid economic 
growth. But growth was greatly tempered by low initial income (since the vast majority 
of the population were subsistence farmers), continuing population growth, and failed 
monsoons in the 1960’s (Cullather, 2010). Hence, despite all efforts, India seemed poised 
to face another desperate food shortage. 
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For contemporary Western observers, it seemed clear, once again, that India’s 
expanding population was to blame for this shortage. South African writer Ronald Segal 
(1965) takes a slightly more holistic and largely sympathetic view than his 
contemporaries, acknowledging the exploitative nature of industrialism and the ways 
India might simultaneously be exploited by other nations even as it exploits its own rural 
poor (although he describes the vast numbers of the rural poor as “economic parasites”). 
Yet, he argues that “independence itself struck a serious blow to the already weak Indian 
economy with the establishment of Pakistan,” whereas, as we have seen, colonization 
was responsible for much of India’s impoverishment in the first place (Segal, 1965, p. 
191). Although it must be stated that India did indeed lose important tracts of agricultural 
land, as well as research institutes, to partition (Perkins, 1997). Other writers saw India’s 
situation as symptomatic of overpopulation, which they considered to be a global 
problem. American biologist Paul Ehrlich (1968) begins his seminal work The 
Population Bomb, in which he asserts the imminence of mass devastation and human 
misery as a direct consequence of global overpopulation straining the finite resources of 
the world, thusly:  
I have understood the population explosion intellectually for a long time. I came 
to understand it emotionally one stinking hot night in Delhi a couple of years 
ago…As we crawled through the city, we entered a crowded slum area. The 
temperature was well over 100, and the air was a haze of dust and smoke. The 
streets seemed alive with people. People eating, people washing, people sleeping. 
People visiting, arguing, and screaming. People thrusting their hands through the 
taxi window, begging. People defecating and urinating. People clinging to buses. 
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People herding animals. People, people, people, people. As we moved slowly 
through the mob, hand horn squawking, the dust, noise, heat, and cooking fires 
gave the scene a hellish aspect…We were just some overprivileged tourists, 
unaccustomed to the sights and sounds of India. Perhaps, but since that night I’ve 
known the feel of overpopulation (p. 17). 
 
 As illustrated in the above quote, although Ehrlich considers overpopulation and 
undernutrition to be a worldwide phenomenon (mostly affected developing countries but 
that would soon encompass all nations), he views India as particularly emblematic of the 
situation. Moreover, his writing recalls the Orientalist depictions of India alluded to 
previously, painting a portrait of India as a grotesque, “stinking hot” and “hellish” 
(Ehrlich, 1968, p. 17). Even as he reminds readers of the basic humanity of the 
impoverished and starving embodied by the term “overpopulation”, stating for example: 
“what we must never forget as we contemplate our unprecedented problems-that in all the 
mess of expanding population, faltering food production, and environmental deterioration 
are enmeshed miserable, hungry, desperate human beings”, he portrays them in equal (if 
not greater) measure as pestilential, pitiable in their own right but collectively a danger to 
the global community (Ehrlich, 1968, p. 44). 
Ehrlich (1968) estimates in The Population Bomb that famine conditions would 
be reached throughout the world by the 1970’s and 1980’s. Although he acknowledges 
the possibility of increasing agricultural production through the increased use of 
fertilizers in order to avert the food shortages he predicts, he considers those stop-gap 
measures that would ultimately be outpaced by continued population growth, while also 
having deleterious effects on the environment (Ehrlich, 1968). As noted previously, fears 
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of overpopulation have existed for centuries. However, the perils of consumption needs 
outstripping production capacity became all the more salient in the turbulent political 
climate of the 1960’s, a time in which the us-versus-them existential fears of the Cold 
War rested uncomfortably with the growing environmental consciousness and ethos of a 
“Spaceship Earth” (Deese, 2009). This tension is visible in Ehrlich’s writing, which 
oscillates between sympathy for the plight of the starving masses in the developing 
world, and concern for how their plight will ultimately affect citizens of the United 
States.  
Ehrlich (1968) offers a limited role for the United States to provide food aid, 
which was in fact done, mostly through providing loans so that India could buy American 
wheat. However, he provides this as a temporary fix, stating: “We [have] also, in the 
opinion of some, hindered India’s own agricultural development. Perhaps we gave too 
many Indians the impression that we have an unlimited capacity to ship them food. 
Unhappily, we do not” (Ehrlich, 1968, p. 38). Thus, the only solution in his view is to 
take immediate and dramatic action to curtail population growth, particularly in 
developing nations such as India, which would mitigate (but by no means eradicate) 
starvation and shortage throughout the world. Of course, the United States should, in 
Ehrlich’s view, take the lead in both halting its own population growth and ensuring that 
action be taken in other nations as well due to its own high consumption levels, as well as 
its prominence in international affairs (Ehrlich, 1968). 
Ehrlich was far from alone in this assessment. In fact, his work was heavily 
influenced by the book Famine-1975! America’s Decision: Who Will Survive?, published 
a year before The Population Bomb. In Famine-1975!, authors William and Paul Paddock 
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(1967) similarly predict impending global food crises brought about by overpopulation 
and propose immediate, drastic action be taken to mitigate their impacts. They, too, view 
the US as playing a pivotal role in finding the solution to this problem, as illustrated by 
their book’s subtitle. They argue that it is mainly the US that might be relied upon to 
provide some of the necessary amounts of wheat to the rest of the world (wheat being a 
“bulk food” item already widely in production in the US and thus an ideal candidate for 
export)(Paddock & Paddock, 1967).  However, given the US’ limited capacity to increase 
its own agricultural production, they advocate for the development of a “triage system” 
so that the US might decide which countries to sponsor with food aid and which must be 
declared a part of the “can’t-be-saved” group (Paddock & Paddock, 1967, p. 207). Those 
deemed to be beyond help would thus not receive aid, as it would be akin to “throw[ing] 
sand in the ocean” (Paddock & Paddock, 1967, p. 207).  
Because of the pivotal role the Paddocks see the United States playing in not only 
ensuring that as much of the globe as possible gets through the crisis without “sinking 
into chaos”, but also in creating a “’better’ life (both spiritual and material)” through “the 
support of American capital goods which today nearly equal all those possessed by the 
rest of mankind”, they believe it justified that American interests be given consideration 
when determining which nations should receive aid (Paddock & Paddock, 1967, p. 210). 
Among other strategies for determining which nations to award American aid, they 
advise that American officials “ignore the prospect that if food is withheld from a country 
it will ‘go communist’”, since “a nation in the chaos of famine poses no threat of disaster 
to us” (Paddock & Paddock, 1967, p. 210, 211). Instead, they suggest that priority be 
given to those nations that have raw materials “required by the American and the world 
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economy” as well as those that have “military value” to the United States (in addition to 
belonging to at least the “walking wounded” triage category) (Paddock & Paddock, 1967, 
p. 212). While perhaps par for the course of political strategizing, this prioritizing of 
countries that provide benefits to the US certainly has neocolonial undertones. Like 
Ehrlich, Paddock and Paddock (1967) viewed India as particularly emblematic of the 
problems facing the rest of the developing world (and, if left unchecked, the developed 
world). They describe India as: “the bellwether that shows the path which the others, like 
sheep going to the slaughter, are following…The future of mankind is now being ground 
out in India. If no solution [is found], all the world will live as India does now” (Paddock 
& Paddock, 1967, p. 56-57).  
Obviously, this prediction has not come to pass (although Ehrlich would simply 
add a “yet”). In fact, while much of India’s population remains woefully undernourished, 
with India’s undernourished population constituting 20% of the total global 
undernourished population, India has not seen famine conditions since 1943. This is due 
in large part to the Green Revolution, which, funded predominately by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, introduced modern industrial agriculture to India and much of the rest of the 
world (Perkins, 1997). High yield varieties of wheat, which necessitated the use of 
fertilizers, were developed through the combined efforts of several scientists, including 
American agronomist Dr. Norman Borlaug and Indian geneticist M.S. Swaminathan. 
Increased irrigation allowed for biannual crops, as farmers were no longer solely reliant 
on monsoon conditions (Perkins, 1997). These methods were met with enthusiasm by 
Indian farmers and were largely publicly funded, both of which factored greatly into the 
success of their implementation.  
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The Green Revolution was predicated upon the assumption that India’s food 
needs were a simple matter of supply not meeting demand. As policy in India, this 
assumption finds its roots in a report by a team of American experts, organized by the 
Ford Foundation and headed by Sherman Johnson of the USDA, titled India’s Food 
Crisis and Steps to Meet It (Perkins, 1997). This report was “a milestone that shifted 
India’s agrarian strategy from one based on social reform (albeit implemented with fatal 
internal contradictions) to one based on new technology, to be adopted by the growers 
and landowners most prepared to adopt the new practices” (Perkins, 1997, p. 181). This 
report specifically framed India’s needs in terms of rapidly increasing production in order 
to keep up with population increases. Initially, the Indian response to this report was less 
than enthusiastic, but factors including a series of severe drought, Nehru’s passing, and 
the dramatic yield increases made possible by Borlaug’s seed varieties, opened the door 
to the Green Revolution in India (Perkins, 1997). 
In this way, the Green Revolution became an example of the ability of technology 
to solve seemingly unsolvable problems, including the Malthusian dilemma. However, 
while the benefits of the Green Revolution cannot be denied, they should be qualified. 
Firstly, as Cullather (2010) notes “the green revolution epicenters—Pakistan, India, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Mexico, the Philippines, and Indonesia—are all among the most 
undernourished nations, each with higher rates of adult and childhood malnutrition and 
deficiency diseases … than most Sub-Saharan countries,” bringing claims about the 
success of the Green Revolution into question. The Green Revolution allowed India to 
vastly increase its agricultural output of grains, turning the country into a net exporter of 
wheat (and later rice), for example, rather than one that must rely on expensive imports 
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and foreign food aid. However, wheat is not nearly as nutritious as many other grains, 
and its production in monocultures meant that other common nutritious Indian plants, 
such as amaranth greens, came to be seen as weeds (Shiva, 2016). Therefore, while 
increasing the efficient production of wheat vastly increased the amount of calories 
produced in India, it did not necessarily impact local nutrition levels, particularly 
because, as previously stated, much of that wheat is exported. Similarly, it did little to 
address distribution, which is arguably as important a factor in the creation of food 
security as the production of food itself.  
The Green Revolution also necessitated the heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides, 
which have had wide-ranging deleterious effects on both an ecological and human-health 
level (particularly since many small-scale farmers apply both to their fields without any 
sort of protective-wear) (Pepper, 2008). Furthermore, farmers must purchase these inputs, 
which often requires taking out predatory loans, becoming especially problematic when 
harvests fail (Shiva, 2016). Additionally, while this increased output potentially created 
wealth for certain farmers, Green Revolution technology’s applications were limited to 
regions that already had irrigation systems in place- predominately Punjab, but also 
Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (Swaminathan, 2016). Even this wealth, though, is 
questionable, in the Indian context at least, because as the Times of India estimated, 
farmers in Uttar Pradesh actually earned 11 rupees less per quintal with dwarf wheat 
when accounting for the cost of fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and rent (Cullather, 2010). 
There is also a question of motive in the US’ staunch advocacy for Green 
Revolution technology throughout the world. Peter Singer (1972), writing after the start 
of the Green Revolution in India, cites the suffering taking place in Bengal in order to 
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argue that affluent nations, and individuals, should contribute what they can to alleviate 
the suffering of others, so long as they do not lose anything of equal moral value in doing 
so. Undoubtedly, humanitarian concerns for the well-being of starving peoples played a 
role in the US’ drive to export Green Revolution technology (especially for Norman 
Borlaug himself), and the needs of Indian people at the time were certainly dire. But, as 
economist and author John Perkins (1997) argues, a far greater role seems to have been 
played by the US’ desire to limit the spread of Communism (since populations on the 
brink might be more easily swayed by the allure of egalitarianism). Perkins (1997) even 
notes that, as far back as 1949, the US State Department and the Indian embassy were in 
talks over “bartering wheat for manganese, a strategic mineral for the American armed 
forces” (p. 174). Especially given the US’ disastrous foray into Vietnam, there was ample 
incentive to keep Communism out of India (Cullather, 2010). In fact, the term “Green 
Revolution” itself was meant to connote that “there has been a major breakthrough…that 
this has been achieved by peaceful and ‘democratic’ means; and that a ‘red revolution’ 
has been unnecessary or has been averted” (T.J. Byres, quoted in Cullather, 2010, p. 
233). Thus, The Green Revolution itself set a precedent for the US to use science as a 
tool of foreign policy.  
In recent years, a number of factors, such as India’s position in the information 
technology sector, its quickly growing economy, and its large, youthful labor force, have 
combined to make India a “potential world superpower” with an increasingly affluent 
middle class (Sanghoee, 2015). Perhaps because of this, American fears over India seem 
to have shifted significantly from the 1960’s-era fears over whether Americans can afford 
to provide India aid toward a fear of what India’s increases in both population and 
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economic activity might mean for the United States. Some of these fears concern how 
India’s increasing power on the world stage through the information technology field 
might put the US at a disadvantage (Higher Education, 2016). Others center on India’s 
rising middle class, their increased consumption patterns, and the attendant effects on 
global climate change (Mazumdaru, 2017). Interestingly, while concern over India’s 
population growth specifically appears to have died down somewhat (except where 
connected to rising affluence in India), concerns over global population growth are often 
described in news outlets in terms of how many “Indias” will be added to the global 
population by a certain date, e.g. “a projected 1 billion increase in global population-
which is like adding another India or China” (McTigue Pierce, 2013). Thus, India 
remains intrinsically tied to Western population fears. 
Despite India’s substantial economic growth, however, wealth is unequally 
distributed. In fact, according to the “Global Wealth Report 2016” compiled by Credit 
Suisse Research Institute, India ranks second in the world in terms of wealth inequality, 
with the top 1% of the population owning 58.4% of the country’s wealth (Kersley and 
Koutsoukis, 2016). Although measuring poverty levels is difficult and often 
controversial, India’s 2011 census showed that approximately 30% of the population still 
lives in poverty (Katyal, 2015). Approximately 70% of the population is rural and 
engaged in small-scale agriculture, with the majority of farmers eking out a living on less 
than 2 hectares of land (Katyal, 2015). Furthermore, the prevalence of farmer suicides in 
India has been a well-documented issue since at least the 1990’s, with multiple sources-
from lack of available credit to poor harvests to overwhelming debt to the “failure” of Bt 
cotton- being cited as the cause (Swaminathan, 2016; Shiva, 2016). This dire state of 
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affairs, coupled with concerns over how global climate change will impact agricultural 
production, particularly in the vast swathes of Indian agricultural land reliant on 
monsoons, have led to calls for a “second Green Revolution”, which for many would take 
the form of vastly increased utilization of biotechnology (obviously not the same people 
who attribute farmer suicides to Bt technology). 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a staunch advocate for biotechnology. In 2015, 
the Indian government launched the “National Biotechnology Development Strategy 
2015-2020” program with the goal of turning India into a biotechnology hub, of which 
agri-biotechnology would comprise one part (Government Unveils, 2015). In the 
meantime, as recently as 2017, Indian farmers protested against low sale prices and high 
loan debts. Farmers in the state of Mahrashtra, for example, began a strike curtailing 
transport of vegetables and milk to Mumbai in a bid to demand billions of dollars in debt 
relief and better prices for their goods (Jadhav, 2017). Additionally, a farmers’ protest in 
Madhya Pradesh turned violent, with police killing at least five farmers (Priya Mitra and 
Santoshi, 2017). The protests in Mahrashtra were eventually halted because the state 
government announced loan waivers and increased prices for milk (Khapre, 2017). 
However, such short-term loan waivers are largely stop-gap measures. 
As I have illustrated, there is a long history of Orientalist thought in regards to 
India and Indian hunger, both in Britain and later the United States. During the colonial 
period, British experts assigned blame for inadequate rations to Indian fecundity. Rather 
than seeing their own role in creating shortages by diverting agriculture to cash crops for 
British use, for example, the British actually viewed their interference in India as 
benevolent, by supposedly ending warfare and infanticide. In actuality, British policy 
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drove India to the brink and eventually toward independence. The United States took up 
the British mantle of simplifying India’s dire agricultural needs to a mismatch of supply 
and demand, for which the Indian people were largely to blame. Although the United 
States did offer aid, including through Green Revolution technology, this aid was 
predicated upon the idea that the United States would ultimately reap benefits, whether 
through trade agreements or simply by staving off the rise of Communism. 
This fraught history is important to bear in mind when considering the question of 
whether biotechnology should be disseminated throughout the world, especially in those 
developing countries that have been argued to “need” GMOs in order to survive. After 
all, many such countries share histories of colonial exploitation that have impacted their 
agricultural production which, as with India, are not considered when assessing current 
agricultural needs. Such oversight presents the possibility of leaving the true drivers of 
hunger unaddressed in favor of providing new technologies. Furthermore, such countries 
have prima facie reason to be suspect of the United States’ role in forwarding such 
technologies, given its history of political maneuvering disguised as providing 
humanitarian aid.    
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CHAPTER III.  
VANDANA SHIVA: VOICING AN ANTI-COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE ON GMOs 
For many, feminist environmental activist, founder of the Navdanya movement, 
which seeks to conserve native seeds and promote small-scale organic agriculture, and 
prolific anti-globalization writer Vandana Shiva is the public face of the global anti GMO 
movement. She is also perhaps as polarizing a figure as the GMO debate itself. Journalist 
Bill Moyers, for example, referred to her in a 2004 interview as a “‘rock star’ in the 
global battle over genetically modified seeds” (Entine, 2014). The New Yorker writer 
Michael Specter (2014), on the other hand, paints her as a well-intentioned (and highly 
privileged) activist but ultimately a zealot, likening her to an “end-of-days mystic”. Paul 
Thompson offers, rather tongue-in-cheek, that “no one is better at the thirty-second 
soundbite on behalf of the poor” (2015, p. 231). To proponents of biotechnology, Shiva is 
mainly a charismatic fearmonger who overstates her scientific credentials, having once 
studied to become a physicist (About Dr. Vandana Shiva, n.d.).  
To be sure, Shiva (2016) regularly utilizes incendiary rhetoric to make her points 
and has made several dubious, or at the very least, hitherto unsubstantiated claims about 
the dangers of GMOs to human and environmental health, including inking their use to 
rising autism diagnoses and drawing parallels between their use and slavery. This rhetoric 
makes it easy for the undiscerning reader to disregard her argument in its entirety without 
recognizing its merits. While not without problem, her work, as exemplified in her 2016 
book Who Really Feeds the World?, illuminates the myriad ways in which the global 
food system, the rise of industrial agriculture, and the overwhelmingly Western corporate 
push to move GM crops into production in the developing world operate in ways that 
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parallel colonial forces. Furthermore, she deftly illustrates how such pressures further 
marginalize women in a manner that goes largely unacknowledged in the broader 
discourse, despite the fact that women form almost half the global agricultural labor force 
and that agricultural labor is increasingly feminized in the developing world (Shiva, 
2016). On these bases, she makes a compelling case for the disavowal of biotechnology 
in favor of small-scale traditional agriculture operating on ecological principles and for 
the local market, which she believes to be the key to feeding the world population. 
However, while illuminating the inadequacy of GM technology in its current iterations to 
meet the needs of the developing world’s farmers, Shiva’s critique is hampered by her 
need to answer the question of whether GMOs are a “good” or “bad” technology. 
Therefore, Shiva fails to adequately consider a context in which genetic modification 
might be utilized in more egalitarian ways, for instance by public research institutions 
using indigenous crops.  
Shiva writes from an ecofeminist philosophical perspective. Philosopher Karen 
Warren (2000) describes ecofeminism as taking place at and responding to “the 
intersection between three overlapping areas of concern: feminism (and all the issues 
feminism raises concerning women and other human Others); nature (the natural 
environment), science (especially scientific ecology), development, and technology; and 
local or indigenous perspectives” (p. 44). Warren (2000) further argues that any policy or 
decision-making that does not take place within this intersection “will be ‘prima facie’ 
(‘all other things being equal’) inadequate or unacceptable from the ecofeminist 
perspective” (p. 44). Shiva (2016) enumerates the ways in which GM technology as it’s 
currently produced fails to take place at this intersection. Fundamental to all of Shiva’s 
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arguments related to biotechnology is the question of “For whom?” and “By whom?”, 
which she unequivocally answers with “Western corporations.” Unlike writers such as 
Thompson (2015), Shiva (2016) refuses to separate questions of whether biotechnology 
should be utilized from Thompson’s “side constraints”, such as questions of how they are 
currently being used, who is making the decisions over their use, and who is benefitting 
from their use. In so doing, Shiva (2016) also draws attention to the ways in which the 
power exerted by foreign corporations in the Indian market and agricultural system 
parallels the past influence of colonial forces and how biotechnology in its current 
iterations operates as a tool of these forces. 
Agrochemical corporations operate from, and therefore make products to fit 
within, the industrial agricultural system. Therefore, Shiva’s critique of biotechnology 
begins with a critique of this system, which she views as upholding a detrimentally 
militaristic and reductionist understanding of agro-ecological processes. According to 
Shiva (2016), justification for the industrial paradigm is rooted in two of Western Modern 
Science’s predominating theories, whose ascendency legitimated modern capitalism and, 
with it, colonial exploitation. The first of these is a “Newtonian-Cartesian idea of 
separation: a fragmented world made of fixed, immutable atoms” (Shiva, 2016, p. 4). 
According to Shiva, this theory allows for a conceptualization of Nature as inert, dead 
material that can be “used, moved, and substituted without any overarching 
consequences” (2016, p. 4).  This claim is backed by ecofeminist historian Carolyn 
Merchant (1980/1983), who argues that the scientific revolution contributed to the 
separation of nature and culture, allowing for the Earth to be viewed as inert and thereby 
able to be exploited without moral qualm. The second theory is Darwin’s theory of 
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competition as the driving force of evolution (Shiva, 2016). Together, argues Shiva 
(2016), these theories form a “reductionist, mechanistic paradigm of knowledge that 
permits limitless exploitation” (p. 7). 
In Shiva’s (2016) view, this knowledge paradigm paved the way for industrial 
agriculture in a number of ways that have proven harmful to the environment and, in 
limiting the long-term viability of agricultural production, farmers. Firstly, the idea that 
Nature is non-living, which as stated previously, allows for its component parts to be seen 
as moveable and substitutable, underlies monoculture, a mainstay of industrial agriculture 
(of course, the ability to isolate, move, and puzzle together discrete pieces of genetic 
material also underlies the concept of biotechnology [Stone and Glover, 2016]). This is 
because, if soil life and native biodiversity are non-essential to the wellbeing of a region, 
they can easily be substituted for a single crop without adverse effect. Furthermore, 
returning organic matter to the soil in a cyclical process supposedly becomes 
nonessential, as a given crop’s nutritional needs may easily be met by substituting 
synthetic fertilizers for more naturally occurring ones like compost and manure. 
However, studies have shown that this is not the case; industrial monoculture farming 
actually depletes soils over time, reducing their productivity and making them more 
prone to erosion (Altieri, 1998).  
Secondly, rather than operating through a system of cooperation, according to 
Shiva (2016), Darwin’s theory of competition allowed for the creation of a militarized 
“us-versus-them” ideology of agricultural production, both figuratively and literally. 
Darwin’s theory of competition then legitimates the use of pesticides-including 
insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides- to annihilate undesired populations because, in a 
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paradigm of competition, their very presence represents a threat to the viability of 
agricultural crop life (Shiva, 2016). Shiva (2016) consistently traces a historical arc from 
warfare to modern industrial agriculture, including the use of GMOs. The history of agro-
chemicals is, indeed, rooted in warfare technologies. Among several other examples, the 
fossil fuel-intensive Haber-Bosch process of nitrogen fixation that allows for the creation 
of synthetic fertilizers was invented around the time of WWI, allowing Germany to 
engage in the war for far longer than they would otherwise have been able (Barach, 
2016). During the WWII era, several chemical and pharmaceutical companies that now 
operate in the agricultural sector were involved in the production of noxious gases for use 
as weaponry. For example, German company IG Farben was implicated in the creation of 
gases for use in Nazi concentration camps, as well as the use of slave labor from said 
camps (Andrews, 1999). Due to this violent military history and, more importantly, to the 
fact that these same companies now operate as agro-chemical companies, Shiva argues 
that the entire system of industrial agriculture, which relies on the use of pesticides from 
these companies, is “rooted in war” (Shiva, 2016, p. x). This is dangerous because “when 
applied to agriculture and the food system, a paradigm rooted in the violence of war and a 
militarized mindset brings the war to our fields, to our plates, and to our bodies” (Shiva, 
2016, p. x). Thus, according to Shiva (2016), industrial agriculture in and of itself is 
essentially an act of war, validated by Darwinian competition and upheld by corporations 
operating according to a profit motive.  
Shiva (2016) draws a clear connection between modern forces of globalization, 
which allowed for the ascendancy of corporations in a global market, and historic forces 
of colonialism, arguing that the “first wave of globalization began in the seventeenth 
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century” with the “establishment of the East India Company and the signing of the first 
‘free trade agreement’ between the East India Company and the collapsing Mughal 
Empire” (p. 86). This connection, in and of itself, provides reason for farmers in the 
developing world to be leery of corporations. Shiva is not alone in making this 
connection: development sociologist Philip McMichael (2012) traces this same historical 
progression of colonization to globalization and exploitation of the global South in his 
book Development and Social Change: a Global Perspective.  
Shiva (2016) claims that corporations pushed for globalization under the “false” 
claims that it would both increase food production, since corporations can produce in 
greater quantities than small-scale producers can, and make food cheaper, thereby 
increasing its accessibility to the poor (p. 86). Shiva (2016) purports that this first claim 
regarding the benefits of globalization to food production is false because the higher 
yields reported by industrial agriculture are due to a difference in definition of “yield”. In 
determining yield, industrial monocultures only measure the production of a single crop 
without accounting for the high cost of inputs like fertilizers and pesticides (not to 
mention, the seeds themselves); small-scale polycultures, on the other hand, aggregate the 
yields of a variety of crops, without having to account for any large input costs, as their 
inputs largely derive from the farm itself through the use of such methods as seed saving, 
composting, and utilizing animal manures as fertilizer (Shiva, 2016). The second claim is 
false, according to Shiva (2016), because the artificially cheap price of industrial food 
from wealthy nations masks both the high cost of their production inputs and the vast 
sums of money spent by national governments on farm subsidies. As McMichael (2012) 
discusses, the International Monetary Fund forced the liberalization of trade among 
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several nations in the developing world through the imposition of Structural Adjustment 
programs, which prohibit those same countries from offering similar subsidies to their 
own farmers. In combination with free trade agreements, this allows corporations to 
undercut the prices of local goods in other, generally poorer, nations, leading to the 
destruction of local production and the creation of de facto monopolies, under the guise 
of “competition” (Shiva, 2016, p. 87). Therefore, in Shiva’s view, globalization is simply 
a neocolonial tool used to facilitate corporate control. 
Much of Shiva’s critique of biotechnology, and industrial agriculture more 
broadly, focuses on this corporate power. The global seed market is dominated by the top 
ten seed producers, who collectively control one-third of the seed market (Shiva, 2016). 
As it stands now, GM seed production exists solely in the purview of large corporations, 
with Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta being the top three producers of both seeds and 
the herbicides and pesticides used to protect their growth (Shing Castro, 2015). These 
companies operate upon a business model that allows them to recoup the monumental 
costs of research and development through the use of patents, which requires their users 
to buy new seeds annually. By patenting their seeds, companies help to ensure a market 
for their product year after year, as the common farm practice of seed saving becomes 
“patent infringement” (so long as the seeds being saved are from the corporations’ plant 
varieties) (Shiva, 2016). Herein lies a crucial aspect of Shiva’s (2016) critique: while she 
does argue that the patenting of life is fundamentally wrong, she also takes issue with 
patenting specifically because she views it as a form of piracy, which she terms 
“biopiracy” (p. 76). This is because the parent material for GMOs and hybrid varieties 
alike often come from commonly used varieties of crops, which she refers to as farmers’ 
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varieties. These are varieties that have generally been developed and adapted over a 
period of centuries through the work of indigenous farmers, particularly women. Thus, in 
Shiva’s (2016) view, using these varieties to make new “improved” versions that are then 
sold back to the farmers essentially amounts to theft. Because these traditional varieties 
were derived by several farmers working in tandem, with each other and with the 
processes of Nature, saving and sharing seeds freely, Shiva (2016) argues that seeds 
represent a biological “commons”, which is the right of farmers to continue to utilize and 
save as they see fit. Therefore, patenting of these seeds represents a new iteration of the 
undemocratic closure of the commons in the name of capitalism, particularly since 
“globally, more than 1.4 billion people depend on farm-saved seed as their primary seed 
source” (Shiva, 2016, p. 68).   
Shiva (2016) also identifies what she views to be a stark example of cognitive 
dissonance in the arguments of corporations regarding patenting and safety concerns 
about GMOS. Corporations argue that “GMOs are substantially equivalent to non-GMO 
crops and food” and therefore require no special regulations in their utilization. At the 
same time, they claim that GMOs are different and novel enough to warrant patenting; 
thus, “the same GMO is natural when it comes to avoiding responsibility for safety, but it 
is different from the natural- or unnatural- when it comes to owning it”, an argument 
Shiva (2016) describes (not unproblematically) as “ontological schizophrenia” (p. 69). In 
addition, GMO-producing corporations such as Monsanto claim that their seeds are 
designed with desirable traits setting them apart (Unlocking Hidden Potential, n.d.). Of 
course, if such seeds did not, in fact, possess desirable qualities, no one would buy them. 
But Shiva (2016) presents the important question of which traits are considered desirable 
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and by whom. From her viewpoint, the traits embedded in GMOs (and hybrids) are those 
best suited to the needs of corporations, rather than to those of farmers or consumers. 
Arguably the most prominent example of such a trait is the “terminator trait”, as it is 
known by those who oppose its use. “Terminator technology” refers to a technology 
whose purpose would be to produce a form of GM crop that would produce sterile second 
generation seeds, rendering seed saving, if not impossible or even illegal, then certainly 
futile. Fears over this technology reached their zenith in the 1990’s, prompting Monsanto 
to publicly declare in 1999 that it would not utilize such technology in food crops (Myth, 
2017). Throughout this same period, and indeed to this day, Vandana Shiva railed against 
this technology-firstly, for its undemocratic nature (in the same vein as patenting) and 
secondly, for the risk it poses of spreading sterility to non-targeted open pollinated crops, 
which Shiva (2000) argued in her book Stolen Harvest could result in a crisis of both 
food production and biodiversity.   
Critics dismiss Shiva’s concerns about the production of GMOs carrying the 
“terminator” trait, pointing out that such seeds have never been sold; Cornell professor 
Ronald Herring (2006) even goes so far as to refer to the terminator technology 
controversy as a “hoax” (p.472). Shiva (2016) claims that this is only due to a global 
campaign against their use, of which she took part. For their part, Monsanto disavows the 
“myth” that they have ever “commercialized a biotech trait that resulted in sterile-or 
‘Terminator’- seeds” (emphasis mine)(Myth, 2017). But, there is a marked difference 
between not commercializing a piece of technology and not creating a piece of 
technology in the first place, and this careful use of language lends credence to Shiva’s 
assertion that terminator technology is not in use due to public pressure. Herring (2006) 
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further derides the argument that cross-pollination might occur from a sterilized crop, as 
Shiva fears. In contrast, Shiva (2000) points to the tremendous adaptive capacity of 
Nature and the lack of testing on a large scale as reasons in themselves to be leery of the 
technology. While Herring’s point is logical, there is precedent for GM crops behaving 
contrary to expectations (Charles, 2013).  
While terminator technology is perhaps an extreme example, Shiva (2016) 
suggests that the traits that differentiate patented seeds are still best suited to meet the 
needs of the corporations. For example, corporate seeds are designed for monocultural 
production in conjunction with fertilizer and pesticide use, which the same corporations 
also furnish. Some crops, in order to meet the needs of the global market, are bred for 
hardiness during long-distance travel or for uniformity to better facilitate processing 
(Shiva, 2016). Dominic Glover (2010) has also noted in his research the fact that, 
although proponents of biotechnology might argue that GM seeds are scale-neutral, and 
thus beneficial to all farmers, the needs of the farmers themselves are extremely scale-
dependent. For example, for small-scale farmers making their living from a few acres, a 
consistent crop is more valuable than the possibility of a high yield one. Yet corporations 
are able to market their seeds by portraying them as “improved” varieties, thereby 
negating the quality of farmers’ “primitive cultivars”, and implying the superiority of the 
corporate seeds in a move that, while likely not intended as such, connotes a level of 
Eurocentricity (Shiva, 2016, p. 68). In contrast, Shiva (2016) makes a number of aesthetic 
appeals to the value of farmers’ varieties, arguing that they “have taste, nutrition, and 
quality” above and beyond corporate versions, pushing back on the idea that corporate 
seeds are indeed “improved” (p. 68).  
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In addition to bearing traits best suited to meet corporate needs, rather than those 
of farmers, Shiva (2016) argues that GMOs, and any patented seeds, create a pattern of 
violence against farmers. Farmers must often take out loans in order to pay for these 
“improved” seeds, as well as the fertilizers and pesticides in order required to help ensure 
their high yields. Because farming can be a precarious job, with any number of factors-
from changing global prices to unanticipated weather patterns- affecting one’s success, 
these high costs can become a burden to farmers and even push them into debt, 
particularly because a monocultural farm does not have the same insurance built into it 
that a polycultural system has. For example, if a whitefly infestation decimates the cotton 
crop, the farmer who planted only cotton versus a range of crops will suffer far greater 
losses (Shiva, 2016). Shiva (2016) draws a direct connection between corporatized seeds, 
this pattern of indebtedness, and thousands of farmer suicides throughout the world but 
particularly in India. In fact, she argues that this pattern amounts to nothing short of 
“genocide”, wiping out small-scale farmers across the globe (p. 79). Thus, where some 
might argue that it is the pattern of indebtedness itself, rather than GMO seeds and their 
patenting, that has led to farmer suicides, Shiva (2016) portrays the two as being 
inextricably linked. 
The preponderance of corporate seeds also places a particular burden upon Indian 
women farmers (Shiva, 2016). Ownership of land titles is often a prerequisite for 
accessing loans and credit programs, and such loans are often the only way farmers can 
afford to buy the chemical inputs required by hybrid and GM seeds, not to mention the 
seeds themselves (Oxfam India, 2013).Very rarely do women possess titles to the land 
they work. Although data is uncertain, estimates suggest that in Kerala, which has the 
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largest percent of women owners and operators of agricultural land, no more than 14% of 
agricultural land is operated by women (Oxfam India, 2013). While rural Indian men 
often engage in other money-making fields and activities beyond farming, rural women 
are overwhelmingly engaged in agriculture, often as unpaid laborers on family farms or 
as underpaid laborers on someone else’s farm, earning on average 30% less than their 
male counterparts  (Oxfam India, 2013). In essence, women farmers, who form a large 
part of the agricultural workforce and whose collective labor has been vital in the 
production of the parent material utilized in making corporate, including hybrid and GM, 
seed varieties are unable to access these same seeds and are unable to engage in other 
forms of paid agricultural labor.  
For these myriad reasons, Shiva (2016) argues that biotechnology is harmful to 
both the environment and Indian farmers. However, where Shiva views GMOs through 
the lens of the corporate control under which they now function and to which she 
believes them inextricably linked, others value them for their potential to relieve the 
travails of the poor through traits designed to meet their needs, rather than those of 
corporations. The most prominent example of such an iteration of biotechnology is the 
“Golden Rice Project” spearheaded by Ingo Potrykus, which seeks to incorporate beta 
carotene, a precursor to vitamin A, into rice in order to reduce the high incidence of 
childhood vitamin A deficiencies in South Asia, particularly in the Philippines (Golden 
Rice, n.d.). Shiva (2016) views such biofortification projects as a means of masking 
corporate interests under the guise of humanitarianism, a conceivable proposition given 
the history outlined in the preceding chapter of Western actors furthering their own goals 
while claiming it to be humanitarian aid. Shiva (2016) believes that the “liberalization, 
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privatization, and globalization trends in agriculture have resulted in the creation of an 
unregulated seed industry”; any regulations that do exist have been, in her view, “either 
abandoned or modified to accommodate multinational and transnational corporations” at 
the expense of both farmers and consumers (p. 78). In contrast, proponents of 
biotechnology such as Potrykus (2012), argue that the corporate control of biotechnology 
is actually the result of overzealous regulations on the part of government. Potrykus 
(2012) claims that, in fact, unnecessary regulatory hurdles have made research into 
biotechnology far too expensive for any sort of public institution to attempt for the sake 
of the public good- in essence, that regulations have stymied public research, allowing for 
the creation of a monopoly over biotechnology. According to him, such regulations are 
what has kept Golden Rice researchers from achieving their intended goals (Potrykus, 
2012). These hurdles arguably also prevent more local public researchers from 
developing biotechnology indigenously.  
Whereas, for many such as Paul Thompson (2015), the question of whether 
GMOs are an appropriate technology in and of themselves is to some degree separate 
from the question of whether they are being used appropriately, Shiva (2016) argues 
strongly that GMOs are inherently dangerous because of the industrial agricultural model 
for which they were created and to which they are, in her view, inextricably linked. Shiva 
(2016) claims that, rather than industrial agriculture, it is the work of small-scale farmers, 
and women in particular, operating on agroecological principles and working in harmony 
with native biodiversity, who can provide the world with appropriate nourishment. Far 
from being a miracle technology, GMOs thus simply represent another iteration of 
corporate, and colonial, domination and control. Furthermore, rooted as their history is in 
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what she terms the “militarized, mechanistic, reductionist, and fragmented paradigm of 
agriculture”, GMOs are inherently incapable of achieving any end other than destruction 
(Shiva, 2016, p. xviii). Therefore, Shiva argues that a goal of creating global food 
security necessitates a disavowal of both industrial agriculture generally and the use of 
GMOs in particular. Thereby, Shiva’s work illustrates the saliency of colonial history 
within India and the ways in which contemporary interventions may be viewed through 
the same lens, particularly in regards to GMOs. However, through her focus on 
corporations, she precludes the possibility of GM technology ever being utilized outside 
this framework, even if conceived of and produced indigenously. 
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CHAPTER IV.  
M.S. SWAMINATHAN: A POTENTIAL MIDDLE PATH IN THE DEBATE 
Known as the “Indian Father of the Green Revolution” for his role, along with the 
Green Revolution’s other “father” Norman Borlaug, in disseminating modern agricultural 
techniques throughout India in the 1960’s, geneticist M.S. Swaminathan has devoted his 
expansive career to Indian agricultural development. He has served as director general of 
the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, principal secretary of the Indian Ministry of 
Agriculture, and was named one of Time magazine’s twenty most influential Asian 
people of the twentieth century, among other distinctions (Founder: Prof M S 
Swaminathan, n.d.). For the last several decades, he has urged a transition toward what he 
terms an “Evergreen Revolution” founded on principles of sustainability and equitability, 
as outlined in his 2016 book From Green to Evergreen Revolution, which anthologizes 
articles spanning from the early 1990’s to the mid-2000’s he wrote for The Hindu, an 
English-language daily newspaper.  
Within this anthology, Swaminathan (2016) identifies many of the same issues 
with the state of Indian agriculture that Shiva (2016) does, including foreign corporate 
influence, a lack of attention to the needs of small-scale and particularly women farmers, 
and environmental degradation. However, where such issues lead Shiva to reject 
biotechnology for its connection to the industrial agricultural paradigm that upholds these 
issues, Swaminathan (2016) envisions biotechnology as one of many technological tools 
that, in conjunction with services and government programs, could actually address them. 
Swaminathan’s myriad proposals for how to improve the state of Indian agriculture are 
largely reform-based and rely upon a presumptive belief in the goodness of technology, 
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including biotechnology, the modern economic system, and the ability of corporations to 
operate toward the public good. While not ignoring India’s colonial history, 
Swaminathan does not fully address its role as progenitor of the modern global economic 
system and how this connection impacts national and corporate power relations within 
the system. However, he repeatedly iterates the necessity of localized solutions driven by 
indigenous actors. In this way, Swaminathan (2016) illustrates what a historically and 
culturally situated understanding of the role of biotechnology might look like in practice, 
although he does not do so comprehensively. 
Swaminathan’s work fits within the equitable development discourse. Dominic 
Moulden (2013), writing in Nonprofit Quarterly, defines equitable development as 
“development activity with a triple bottom line, taking into account the interests of the 
business community and local developers, fairness in the treatment of employees, and 
sustainability in protecting and enhancing resources (human and others) in responding to 
an array of social and environmental needs” (para.1). Within the context of the GMO 
debate, the equitable development discourse represents a third “alternative” perspective 
that has largely been ignored by adherents to both sides of the debate (Bownas, 2016). 
Swaminathan’s work forges this middle ground by largely bypassing the question of 
whether GMOs are “good” or “bad” (although generally presuming their “goodness”) and 
focusing on the question of how to create a context in which their use provides the most 
benefits to the Indian population, particularly those who have been largely left out of the 
broader development discourse, such as rural populations in general, and small-scale, 
tribal, and women farmers in particular. 
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While Swaminathan views development as a generally positive (and possibly 
inevitable) thing, he argues that rural populations have largely been left out of 
development considerations in favor of macroeconomic policies that are “by and large 
oriented towards the needs of big business and industry, who have powerful organization 
structures to represent them” (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 321). This is, of course, 
problematic in any nation but especially so in India, where approximately 70% of the 
population is rural and agricultural, and most of this population is marginal, with the 
average farm holding being under two hectares (it is important to note as well that this 
population also constitutes 25% of the global farming population) (Swaminathan, 2016). 
This inattention creates a context where rural populations don’t receive adequate support 
for their livelihoods and eventually must seek work elsewhere, either by joining the ever-
growing urban slums in search of work or finding work abroad (Yardley, 2011). 
Swaminathan (2016) argues that this focus is also problematic for the very simple reason 
that development in other sectors, including industrial, cannot occur without support from 
the rural sector, which provides both raw materials and nutrition for the industrial labor 
force.  
Swaminathan’s (2016) extensive plans for improving the state of Indian 
agriculture through an Evergreen Revolution are rooted in his understanding of the 
impacts of the 1960’s Green Revolution in India. Unsurprisingly, given his role in 
bringing it about, Swaminathan (2016) regards the Green Revolution as being largely 
beneficial to farmers, as well as a “blessing in terms of saving land and forests”, under 
the logic that increasing productivity on current agricultural lands allows for conservation 
of lands that might otherwise have been brought into agriculture (p. 28). In contrast to 
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Shiva (2016), Swaminathan (2016) also views it as being instrumental in fostering Indian 
sovereignty, since the nation became far less reliant on foreign food imports as a direct 
result of the Green Revolution technologies.  
On the other hand, Swaminathan (2016) also attributes the success of the Green 
Revolution in large part to circumstances that were already in place at the time, rather 
than lying with the technology itself. Such prerequisites included “owner cultivation 
which provide[d] the motivation for the farmer to make adequate investments in the land, 
consolidation and levelling necessary for efficient water management and soil health 
maintenance, rural communication which facilitate[d] access to markets, rural 
electrification to ensure energy for pumping groundwater and for operating post-harvest 
equipment and a dynamic agricultural research and extension program,” as well as the 
presence of a remunerative market (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 372). However, he is also 
frank about the shortcomings of the Green Revolution. For instance, Swaminathan (2016) 
notes that climatic differences meant that benefits were not evenly distributed. For 
example, much of the Green Revolution involved increasing production of commodity 
products like wheat and cotton, so its benefits were not felt in rainfed or dry farming 
areas, where those crops are not as viable (Swaminathan, 2016). He further notes its 
ecological drawbacks, such as environmental pollution and what he refers to as “land and 
water mining” (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 28). He presents these shortcomings, though, as 
an opportunity for growth and improvement in the next Revolution (Swaminathan, 2016). 
In so doing, Swaminathan (2016) puts forth the Green Revolution as a template 
for how to utilize biotechnology as a tool of his Evergreen Revolution, whose purpose he 
defines as “improv[ing] productivity in perpetuity without associated ecological harm” 
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(p. 35). He promotes a “symphony approach”, a combination of cutting-edge technology, 
government services, public policies, and farmer involvement (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 
18). Swaminathan describes technology in general as “the prime mover of the economic 
and ecological well-being of farm families” and consistently urges for advancements to 
be made in both the creation and application of cutting-edge technologies (2016, p. 246). 
Throughout his writing, he makes repeated use of some variation on the phrase “frontier 
technologies like biotechnology, information and renewable energy technologies, [and] 
space applications”, immediately placing biotechnology as just one of several important 
new technologies with potential benefits to India in general and rural populations in 
particular (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 122, 128, 196, 270, 324). Other beneficial technologies 
include the expansion of radio and internet communications in order to better inform 
rural populations of meteorological events so that they might better prepare their crops 
for impending stresses, for example (Swaminathan, 2016). Importantly, Swaminathan 
(2016) also stresses the necessity of improving post-harvest technologies (cooling, 
cleaning, sorting and packaging), without which significant increases in agricultural 
production would mean very little, since the produce would not be preserved long enough 
to be distributed. However, he states that, even with all of these things in place, 
“agriculture may not move forward without proper public policy support in areas such as 
land reform, pricing of inputs and outputs, marketing arrangements to meet the demands 
of both home and external markets and investment decisions relating to irrigation, energy 
supply and rural infrastructure development (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 372). Lastly, while 
acknowledging the import of traditional wisdom and forms of knowledge, Swaminathan 
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(2016) cautions those (such as Shiva) who would return to strictly traditional methods of 
agriculture to recall the prevalence of famines in the pre-independence era. 
Swaminathan (2016) seeks to engage the grassroots enthusiasm he discerned 
during the era of the Green Revolution for his Evergreen Revolution. He puts forth the 
Indian government as purveyors of this grassroots engagement, as illustrated in his 
discussion of the implementation of a potential water conservation program: “The 
programme will be designed so that a small Government Project leads to a mass 
movement…as happened in the case of national demonstrations in wheat during 1964-
65” (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 174).  Similarly, Swaminathan makes repeated references to 
the importance of village life and the implementation of change at the local level which 
then might be spread nationwide. He states, for example, that it is “only community-
centered and decentralized approaches that can help to end poverty and hunger” 
(Swaminathan, 2016 p. 205). However, as with the Green Revolution, he sees a place for 
the national government-some might say contradictively- to be fundamental in initiating 
these grassroot movements and change at the local level. For example, he makes repeated 
reference to the need for initiating-among many other movements- a “bridging the yield 
gap movement” in order to help farmers maximize their potential yields, to a water 
literacy and conservation movement so that water may be more readily available and 
equitably distributed, to a genetic literacy movement, so that people may be well 
informed about, and therefore not unduly fearful of, biotechnology (Swaminathan, 2016, 
p. 92). In this way, though, Swaminathan (2016) illustrates the inadequacy of 
biotechnology or, indeed, any technology by itself, to meet the needs of farmers; rather, 
technology is best understood as a tool to maximize the benefits of other measures. 
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 Swaminathan (2016) states unequivocally that the sustainable agriculture of the 
twenty-first  century will be based largely on the “appropriate use” of biotechnology, for 
which international cooperation will be extremely important (p. 61). He specifically 
advocates for green farming techniques, rather than those of organic agriculture, because 
organic agriculture precludes the use of GMOs and chemical inputs (which he proposes 
to utilize in limited quantities) (Swaminathan, 2016). He argues that the potential of 
biotechnology ultimately depends “upon the imagination and creativity of the researcher 
and the elegance of the tool employed,” but, broadly speaking, he views it as having 
potential for addressing issues of food security throughout the developing world 
(Swaminathan, 2016, p. 138). For example, possible applications he cites throughout his 
book include:  the development of vaccines; creating crops with resistance to abiotic 
stresses such as salinity, high temperatures and moisture stress, and transboundary pests 
(not unlike the Bt technology currently in use); and potential improvements in both 
animal stocks and crop yields (Swaminathan, 2016). He also sees biotechnology as 
playing a key role in integrated natural resources management and precision farming in 
the following areas: integrated gene management, efficient water management, integrated 
nutrient supply, soil healthcare, integrated pest management, and efficient post-harvest 
management, although he does not specify how (Swaminathan, 2016).  
In addition to helping meet the needs of marginal farmers, Swaminathan also 
views genomics, the discipline that has “contributed to powerful new approaches…used 
in agriculture” and “has helped to promote the biotechnology industry” as an opportunity 
for broad-based Indian entrepreneurship and self-employment (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 
60). He urges the creation of a National Association of Genome Entrepreneurs who could 
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be supported by venture capital in order to enable entrepreneurs to “convert the rich 
knowledge available in government institutions in the field of functional genomics into 
commercially viable products” which they might also utilize in other countries. This 
would ostensibly operate in the same manner as information technology (Swaminathan, 
2016, p. 161), a comparison subtly drawn by his description of biotechnology as creating 
“biological software for ecological agriculture” (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 117), and less 
subtly in his reference to making India a “global outsourcing hub in the areas of plant and 
animal genomics and ICT for the rural poor” (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 44). While 
Swaminathan (2016) does particularly refer to functional genomics, rather than 
biotechnology, he also suggests coursework be created by the National Centre for Plant 
Genome Research, which was established by the Indian Department of Biotechnology, 
thereby further establishing their interrelation.  
In viewing biotechnology as having potentially limitless applications, 
Swaminathan’s perspective does not deviate from those in the pro-GMO discourse. 
However, Swaminathan (2016) does acknowledge the potential for biotechnology to have 
adverse impacts, stating simply (albeit vaguely) that some concerns about the impacts of 
GMOs on human health and the environment are genuine. He does also bring up ethical 
concerns about their potential applications in human genetic engineering, or even 
biological warfare. But, again, he relies on the government (in this case, of every nation) 
to prevent this through the creation of their own institutional regulatory structures, a 
solution most likely to be viewed as problematic by adherents to both sides of the GMO 
debate- on the pro side because such institutions would constitute “unnecessary” 
regulations that would stymie economic innovation, and on the anti side because such 
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structures are not infallible and might additionally be vulnerable to corporate corruption 
(Swaminathan, 2016). 
While Swaminathan (2016) does not skirt the issue of colonialism, his references 
to India’s colonial history mostly occur obliquely, either through discussions of the 
struggles immediately following independence or reminders of the many famines that 
occurred under British rule. Nowhere does he specifically address colonialism as a cause 
of disproportionate wealth between developed and developing countries, for example. 
However, he does acknowledge inequalities within the global market, citing for example 
the fact that most industrialized nations like those in the EU and the United States 
provide their farmers with heavy subsidies that inherently disadvantage small-scale 
producers in the developing world. While he argues in one chapter that these nations 
must be convinced to curb their subsidy programs in order to give Indian farmers a better 
chance in the market, he acknowledges in a later chapter that industrialized nations will 
never be willing to do so. Therefore, he argues instead for the formation of an Indian 
Trade Organization, in the same vein as the World Trade Organization, as a means of 
protecting Indian agricultural interests in the trade process (Swaminathan, 2016). In this 
way, he never questions the base premise that participation in the global market is 
generally beneficial, although it is worth noting that he cautions the Indian government to 
make sure that potential imports don’t negatively impact rural livelihoods, and he warns 
against the creation of “jobless economic growth” that does not translate into substantive 
life and livelihood improvements, thereby voicing a need for reform of the economic 
system (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 116). 
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Swaminathan (2016) does, however, put forth the idea that technologies meant to 
ameliorate Indian agricultural problems must be location-specific and indigenously 
developed in order to be effective. According to Swaminathan (2016), this is because the 
needs of food producers in the developed world, whose numbers are rapidly decreasing 
while the size of the lands they work increase are vastly different from those of the small 
and marginal farmers in India, whose land holdings are continuously shrinking. Thus, in 
his view, biotechnology created outside of the developing world will likely not meet the 
needs of farmers from those regions. As he states, “Research solely directed to the needs 
of resource-poor small farmers is unlikely to attract the attention of large companies 
whose priorities are generally determined by the magic of the marketplace” 
(Swaminathan, 2016, p. 137). He likens these circumstances to large pharmaceutical 
companies who don’t bother researching a vaccine for leprosy because they know that 
those afflicted with leprosy would never be able to afford it. Swaminathan (2016) thereby 
acknowledges the limitations of the corporate sector to address India’s needs without 
going so far as to actively criticize it. He does, however, see a place for international 
cooperation, with “advanced research institutions in industrialized countries and 
researchers in developing countries, commit[ing] to harnessing science for the public 
good” (rather than excluding the poor to inventions that will increase food security by 
adhering to individual property rights) (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 271). Additionally, he 
expresses the concern that biotechnology might present problems for agriculture in the 
“Third World” if it were implemented to create synthesized versions of export products 
such as “sugar, steroids, vanilla and other flavours and gums” (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 
140). Of course, Swaminathan (2016) does not suggest that development of such 
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technologies should somehow be halted, but rather that their applications should be 
anticipated so that marketing problems (presumably, marketing the natural product in the 
face of cheaper synthetic substitutes) might be mitigated. 
Like Shiva (2016), Swaminathan (2016) is concerned with the impact that 
patenting might have on rural populations, particularly those whose labor went into the 
creation of the parent material for patented seeds. He argues that the commercialization 
of knowledge should not inhibit its sharing for public good in local communities, citing 
fears that these companies will monopolize the market and become the only source of 
both these new seeds and the “chemicals needed to control the pests to which the new 
strains may be susceptible” (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 136). However, Swaminathan’s 
(2016) solution to the issue is more reform-based than revolutionary. He finds the 
solution to the issue in re-envisioning intellectual property rights to somehow incorporate 
whole communities (as opposed to solely being available to individuals or corporations). 
Instead of pushing for the consideration of seeds as part of a biological “commons”, as 
Shiva (2016) proposes, Swaminathan argues that, since “contributions are often made by 
entire communities and therefore cannot be attributed to individuals…procedures are 
needed to recognize and reward community contributions to genetic resources 
conservation and selection (2016, p. 300-301). Although he discusses the need for 
creating “possible formulas for the sharing of benefits based on different benefit-
indicators establishing the relative total amounts and relative contributions corresponding 
to each country and region”, he does not attempt to explain how such formulas might be 
created or how they would affect contributors at the community-level (Swamanathan, 
2016, p. 301). 
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Yet, Swaminathan (2016) is at pains to acknowledge the labor that tribal and 
women farmers make to, not only the agricultural system, but conservation of 
biodiversity, and he therefore seeks ways to acknowledge their work within the context of 
the modern economic system. Swaminathan (2016) argues that economic incentives are 
the best way to concomitantly promote conservation and an appreciation of traditional 
wisdom and local biodiversity. According to him, this might be accomplished by the 
establishment of “bio-valleys” in areas rich in bio-resources, which he argues might 
become “to [non-GMO] biotechnology what the Silicon Valley is to information 
technology” (although he does not adequately describe what form this “non-GMO 
biotechnology” might take)  (Swaminathan, 2016, p. 36). These biovalleys would aim to 
“promote an era of bio-happiness arising from the conservation and sustainable use of 
bio-diversity, leading to more jobs and income for the local population” (Swaminathan, 
p. 180). He also suggests creating an award-based system, with a monetary prize, of 
recognizing conservation work, such as the already existing “Genome Saviour Award” 
(Swaminathan, 2016, p. 36). For him, such awards are important because rural and tribal, 
predominately female, populations are already practicing conservation work at great 
personal cost, while the broader public is also reaping the benefits of their work 
(Swaminathan, 2016). 
While Swaminathan (2016) does not contradict the claim made by others such as 
Shiva (2016) that biotechnology might bear some responsibility for decreasing 
biodiversity, he does actually argue that, at the very least, genetic engineering has 
enhanced the economic value of biodiversity by “render[ing] the transfer of genes across 
sexual barriers possible” (p. 288). Furthermore, he argues that “food, biotechnological 
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and pharmaceutical industries have an economic stake in the use of biodiversity” since 
the diversity of the natural world often provides their source material. Under his logic 
regarding economic stakes being important for promulgating conservation practices, it 
would stand to reason then that these industries would practice conservation methods; 
however, he does not make this argument (305). In this way, he again avoids critique of 
the corporate sector.  
  As a prominent voice for the equitable development perspective in the Indian 
GMO debate, M.S. Swaminathan (2016) argues strongly for the creation of an Evergreen 
Revolution loosely modeled on the experience of the earlier Green Revolution. The 
purpose of the Evergreen Revolution would be to sustainably provide adequate nutrition 
for the Indian population, remunerative work for farmers, and acknowledgement of the 
contributions of women and tribal communities to agriculture. To that end, he provides 
myriad suggestions and plans for how agriculture might become simultaneously more 
productive, beneficial to the farmers themselves, and ecologically benign. Swaminathan 
(2016) argues strongly for a place for biotechnology within this Revolution but 
acknowledges that its usefulness as a technology extends only so far as there are adequate 
government programs in place to support it and local enthusiasm for it. Furthermore, he 
illustrates the necessity of locally-focused and indigenously created programs and 
iterations of biotechnology in order to ensure benefits to targeted populations. Although 
his focus on the Green Revolution and beyond means that he does not fully grapple with 
India’s colonial history and its effect on the current state of Indian agriculture, he still 
successfully provides a compelling plan for how to situate biotechnology in a culturally 
and historically significant manner. 
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CHAPTER V.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 It has not been my goal here to definitively ascertain whether or not agricultural 
biotechnology is an appropriate solution to the problem of world hunger. Rather, I have 
attempted to illustrate the following: first, that the understanding of hunger as a simple 
supply versus demand equation is an oversimplification that allows for the use of a 
technological fix (in this case, biotechnology) in order to “solve” a multi-faceted issue; 
and second, that this oversimplification potentially ignores vital historical and socio-
cultural contexts that factor greatly into the successfulness and acceptability of this 
technology. Therefore, debates in the US and other places that revolve solely around the 
risk/safety aspects of GMOs in order to ascertain whether they’re “good” or “bad” 
sidestep the important issue of how GMOs are embedded in a particular mode of 
agriculture whose merits are largely taken for granted in the United States. Thus, the oft-
used argument that GMOs are necessary to feed the “developing” world, particularly in 
the face of global climate change, assumes that hunger is caused in large part by 
inadequate supply, rather than myriad factors including trade imbalances, inadequate 
distribution, and education, among others. Furthermore, this argument sets up support for 
biotechnology as a moral imperative, as no one would argue against wanting people in 
need to have enough food. However, this perspective also removes a certain level of 
culpability, because “developed nations” and, indeed, modern industrial agriculture itself, 
have contributed largely to the creation of the global climate change that now threatens 
agricultural production in much of the world (and which is used as further proof of the 
need for biotechnological development).  
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I have utilized India as a case study through which to better understand the need 
for contextualization in the GMO debate, both because of its status as a “developing” 
country with a high population, a large percentage of whom are malnourished, making it 
a seemingly ideal locus for the utilization of GMOs, and because of its complicated 
history with the West (predominantly Britain and then the United States). I have 
illustrated that India’s history of famine and hunger has largely been understood in the 
past along those same terms of supply versus demand, when in reality, they were due in 
large part to colonial administrative decisions. These famines were then exacerbated by 
the British’s limited understanding of hunger in India at the time as simply a population 
issue. This understanding predominated after India’s independence, during which time 
the United States took a leading role in both attempting to curtail population growth in 
the “developing” world and modernizing agriculture through the Green Revolution in 
order to increase production, relying mainly on cereal monocultures and necessitating the 
use of both fertilizers and pesticides. While understood by many as a humanitarian, life-
saving gesture, this was also done largely to suit the US’ political agenda of limiting the 
spread of communism. More importantly, even as India has become a net exporter of the 
crops produced through Green Revolution technology (mainly wheat and rice), hunger 
remains an issue for much of the Indian population. Thus, this history illustrates the 
limited capacity of a new technology to solve a broad-based issue, and it serves as a 
reminder to question the narrative of humanitarian intention on the part of the US, a 
narrative which is often forwarded to promote biotechnology for use in the “developing” 
world. 
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I have also analyzed two alternative perspectives on the role GMOs have to play 
in Indian agriculture, both of which illustrate that there is more to the issue of addressing 
hunger and the needs of farmers than simply increasing the supply of agricultural 
products. Vandana Shiva (2016), a staunch anti-GMO advocate, makes a strong case for 
why GMOs in their current iterations are ill-suited to the needs of Indian farmers, 
especially women farmers, and may, in fact, be placing a greater burden upon them. In 
order to make this case, she illustrates the intrinsic ties that GMOs have with industrial 
agriculture, which she argues has ultimately been detrimental to India because of its 
reliance on a few varieties of crops grown in monocultures that require chemical inputs. 
She further illuminates the ways in which corporate control, particularly foreign control, 
of the seed industry recollects the colonial domination India fought so hard to overcome 
(a sentiment which likely finds resonance throughout the “developing” world in a way 
that might not fully be understood by the “developed” world). However, like pro-GMO 
voices in the “developed world”, Shiva’s critique is mired by her need to definitely 
answer the question of biotechnology’s “goodness” or “badness”. Ultimately, though, 
Shiva’s (2016) perspective reveals why GMOs in their current context and current 
iterations are ill-suited to meeting the needs of Indian farmers. 
Swaminathan (2016), on the other hand, is far more amenable to the use of 
biotechnology in India. But, by and large, he successfully side-steps the abstract question 
of whether GMOs are “good” or “bad” by focusing his attention on providing myriad 
suggestions for how to create a context in which they might be made useful and 
beneficial to the Indian population. Using the Green Revolution as a template for 
enacting far-reaching agricultural reform, he recommends the development of rural 
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infrastructure, particularly post-harvest technologies, the widespread improvement of 
irrigation and water harvesting capacity, greater reliance on integrated pest management, 
increased access to credit and non-predatory loans, and government subsidies, among 
many other suggestions. He also repeatedly expresses the importance of tailoring both 
technology and reforms to the needs of local populations, as well as the local 
environment and argues that indigenous researchers are best suited to doing so. Although 
his focus on the Green Revolution and beyond largely brushes over the extant legacy of 
colonialism on Indian culture and relations between “developed” and “developing” 
countries, Swaminathan (2016) nevertheless provides a carefully considered and far-
reaching example of how, given the right context, biotechnology could become a suitable 
and beneficial technology in the “developing” world.  
The allure of biotechnology’s potential is undeniable. The environmental chaos 
that is global climate change becomes a little less terrifying when one imagines crops that 
might be grown in droughts, extreme heat, high salinity, limited space, or any other 
number of undesirable- but increasingly likely- conditions. However, debates over the 
“goodness” or “badness” of GMOs, by and large, miss the point. This is because in 
practice it is important to consider, as Shiva (2016) does, how they currently fit into a 
particular agricultural paradigm and whether that paradigm is, indeed, beneficial to the 
small-scale farmers who feed the majority of the world population. As demonstrated in 
Swaminathan’s (2016) work, there is room for them to provide benefits beyond this 
paradigm, but only insofar as the paradigm is acknowledged and steps are taken to 
ameliorate its ill effects, which is best done at the local level and with the participation of 
farmers themselves. Therefore, the moral argument made by pro-GMO voices in the 
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“developed” world that those in the developed world should stifle their own concerns 
regarding GMOs because of their potential to help the “developing” world ignore the 
ways in which this argument also fails to fully consider the needs of those in the 
“developing” world. 
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